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Abstract: This paper examines whether and how managerial ability affects the 
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The goodwill generated from transaction premium in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
has become an important asset for Chinese companies. The total amount of goodwill 
carrying balances of all A-share listed companies increased from about 30 billion yuan 
in 2007 to 1299 billion yuan in 2018. The ratio of goodwill to assets increased sharply 
from 2013 to 2015 and was above 7% since 2016 (see Appendix A). This fast growth 
of goodwill may become a serious concern for corporate performance1 and has drawn 
the attention of the regulatory authorities. On November 16, 2018, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission issued a risk warning for the accounting supervision of 
goodwill impairment.2 
Against this backdrop, we wonder whether and how managerial ability matters for 
goodwill impairment of Chinese companies. Several studies have examined the 
determinants of goodwill impairment (Beatty & Weber, 2006; Glaum, Landsman, & 
Wyrwa, 2018; Ramanna & Watts, 2012), but none of them concerning the effect of 
managerial ability. An exception is Sun (2016) who finds a negative relationship 
between managerial ability and goodwill impairment of companies listed in the US, but 
the mechanism remains unexplored. Moreover, we can hardly draw experience on 
goodwill impairment from the US due to the difference of accounting supervision and 
corporate culture between the US and China. 
To shed light on the role of managerial ability in goodwill impairment of Chinese 
companies, we perform a moderated mediation analysis based on a sample of 389 
companies listed in the Chinese stock market. These companies recognized goodwill 
impairment losses at least once during the period 2007-2017. First, we examine the 
mediation effect of corporate financial performance in the relationship between 
managerial ability and goodwill impairment. Our primary results show that managerial 
ability has a direct negative impact on the likelihood of goodwill impairment while 
financial performance is positively associated with managerial ability. Further results 
show that the likelihood of goodwill impairment is negatively associated with both 
managerial ability and financial performance. Overall, the results suggest that financial 
 
1 For instance, some researchers find that many companies ever recognized huge goodwill impairment 
at one time, followed by negative sales growth (Jarva, 2009) and/or low cash flows (Z. Li, Shroff, 
Venkataraman, & Zhang, 2011) in subsequent years. Filip et al. (2015) find that managers manipulate 
cash flows to avoid reporting an impairment loss where the manipulation is detrimental to corporate 
future performance. 
2 See http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/kjb/kjbzcgf/xsjzj/sjpgjggz/201811/t20181116_346845.html. 
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performance partially mediates the effect of managerial ability on goodwill impairment. 
These findings support our conjecture that superior managers can better help their 
companies to achieve higher returns and therefore reduce the likelihood of goodwill 
impairment. 
Second, we examine whether the mediation effect of financial performance is 
affected by earnings smoothing motivation. Some studies find that firms with 
unexpected high earnings tended to recognize goodwill impairment to smooth earnings 
(AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares, & Roberts, 2011; Glaum et al., 2018). Such discretion in 
goodwill impairment decisions may weaken the relationship between managerial 
ability and goodwill impairment. Based on a moderated mediation model, we find that 
the earnings smoothing motivation attenuates the negative relationship between 
financial performance and the possibility of goodwill impairment, but has no impact on 
the relationship between managerial ability and financial performance. This suggests 
that earnings smoothing motivation does weaken the relationship between managerial 
ability and goodwill impairment.  
Third, we examine whether the mediation effect of financial performance is 
affected by state ownership as researchers argue that government intervention could be 
both a curse and a blessing for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Feng, Fu, & Kutan, 
2019; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). This means that the impact of state ownership on the 
relationship between managerial ability and goodwill impairment is not easy to judge. 
Based on a moderated mediation model, we find that state ownership weakens the 
impact of managerial ability on both financial performance and the possibility of 
goodwill impairment. This suggests that state ownership not only weakens the 
mediation effect of financial performance, but also lowers the direct effect of 
managerial ability in goodwill impairment. 
Overall, we uncover a moderated mediation effect of financial performance in the 
relationship between managerial ability and goodwill impairment, and call for attention 
to the effects of earnings smoothing motivation and state ownership when analyzing a 
firm’s goodwill impairment decision. The finding is robust to a series of additional tests, 
including the Sobel test for the mediation effect, analysis that excluding the Global 
Financial Crisis, and alternative proxies for managerial ability, financial performance 
and goodwill impairment. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we complement the 
research on determinants of goodwill impairment by shedding light on the impact of 
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managerial ability and its mechanisms. Several studies have examined the determinants 
of goodwill impairment (e.g., see Glaum et al., 2018; Hayn & Hughes, 2006; Ramanna 
& Watts, 2012), but none of them concerning the impact of managerial ability. An 
exception is Sun (2016) who examines the impact of managerial ability on goodwill 
impairment, but he does not explore the mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first to uncover the mediation effect of financial performance. Second, we are 
the first to study the relationship between managerial ability and goodwill impairment 
in the context of Chinese companies and document the moderation effects of earnings 
smoothing and state ownership. Because China is the largest emerging market and the 
second largest economy in the world, our study may have important implications for 
other countries and might lead to a bunch of follow-up studies to verify the relationship 
between managerial ability and goodwill impairment in other countries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related 
research and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology and sample. 
We present our results and analyses in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Motivation and hypotheses 
Goodwill impairment has drawn great attention from researchers with the fast growth 
of M&A activities in recent years, 3  while we are particularly interested in the 
determinants of goodwill impairment. A few studies have tried to examine the 
determinants of goodwill impairment. To name a few, Hayn and Hughes (2006) find 
that acquisition characteristics (such as takeover premium) have positive predictive 
power for future goodwill impairment. (Ramanna and Watts (2012) provide evidence 
of the association of goodwill non-impairment decisions with executive compensation 
and reputation. Glaum et al. (2018) find that goodwill impairment is negatively 
associated with stock returns. However, the impact of managerial ability on goodwill 




3  For instance, researchers have compared the impact of the impairment-only approach and the 
amortization approach on companies’ income statements (Chalmers, Godfrey, & Webster, 2011; 
Hamberg, Paananen, & Novak, 2011), investigated the stock market reaction to goodwill impairment 
(Bens, Heltzer, & Segal, 2011; Li & Sloan, 2017), and analyzed the determinants of goodwill impairment 
(Beatty & Weber, 2006; Glaum et al., 2018; Hayn & Hughes, 2006; Ramanna & Watts, 2012). 
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2.1 Managerial ability, financial performance and goodwill impairment 
The upper echelons theory of Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggests that the experience, 
values and personality of senior executives could affect their perception on their 
companies’ situation and then affect their strategic decisions. Motivated by this theory, 
we conjecture that managerial quality may also be an important factor behind the 
decision of goodwill impairment. Empirically, Brochet and Welch (2012) find that chief 
financial officers with transaction experience can write off goodwill in a more 
informative way. Sun (2016) finds that managerial ability is negatively related to the 
likelihood of goodwill impairment of US companies. Based on these studies, we revisit 
the relationship between managerial ability and goodwill impairment in the context of 
Chinese companies with the following hypothesis: 
H1: The likelihood of goodwill impairment of Chinese companies is negatively 
associated with managerial ability. 
If the negative association does hold for Chinese companies, a further question of 
importance is through which channel that managerial ability affects goodwill 
impairment. Given that goodwill impairment arises when there is deterioration in the 
capabilities of acquired assets to generate excess returns as expected. A natural logic is 
that superior managers can better operate the acquired assets to achieve expected excess 
returns, thereby reducing the likelihood of goodwill impairment. Indeed, some studies 
find that firms with superior managers have higher returns (e.g., P. R. Demerjian, Lev, 
Lewis, & McVay, 2013; Lee, Wang, Chiu, & Tien, 2018). Therefore, we propose the 
following testable hypothesis: 
H2: Financial performance is a mediator in the relationship between managerial 
ability and goodwill impairment of Chinese companies. 
 
2.2 The moderation effect of earnings smoothing motivation 
As earnings provide important information for investment decisions, executives may 
have strong incentives to manage earnings either for shareholders or for self-interest. 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that 
earnings management with different incentives could happen when earnings exceed 
different thresholds. For instance, Iatridis (2015) find that executives of firms with 
significant growth options may opportunistically direct slack resources as corporate 
giving to increase their personal reputation at the expense of shareholders' returns. This 
implies that earnings management can be simply due to executives’ self-interest 
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behavior. In contrast, Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) find that managers tend to 
report smaller earnings surprise to convey more precise private information about future 
cash flow in order to maximize firms’ value. Jiraporn, Miller, Yoon and Kim (2008) 
uncover a positive relationship between earnings management and firm value. These 
studies suggest that earnings management can also be beneficial to shareholders. 
Nevertheless, in the presence of earnings management, companies’ reported 
returns fail to reflect the underlying performance during the reporting periods, so does 
their reported goodwill impairment losses. For instance, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) and 
Glaum et al. (2018) find that firms with unexpected high pre-write-off earnings are 
more likely to write off goodwill. Similarly, Demerjian, Lewis-Western and McVay 
(2020) find that high-ability managers are more likely to engage in earnings smoothing. 
In this case, goodwill impairment losses cannot truly reflect the decline in economic 
values of firms’ goodwill balances implied by realized returns. The presence of earnings 
smoothing may distort the intrinsic relationships between managerial ability, financial 
performance and goodwill impairment. Therefore, we propose the following testable 
hypothesis: 
H3: Earnings smoothing motivation significantly moderates the relationship 
between managerial ability and goodwill impairment. 
 
2.3 The moderation effect of state ownership 
The Chinese government largely involves in resources allocation of the market and 
favors state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As governmental involvement may be “helping 
hands” or “grabbing hands” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994), we wonder whether the 
relationship between managerial ability and goodwill impairment differs in SOEs and 
non-SOEs. 
The argument of “helping hands” suggests that SOEs have priority in obtaining 
bank credit (Cull & Xu, 2003) and receiving subsidies (Li, Lien, & Zheng, 2019) 
compared with non-SOEs. As SOEs enjoy government implicit guarantees, they are 
less likely to be required to provide collaterals when they are in financial distress (An, 
Pan, & Tian, 2014). In contrast, the argument of “grabbing hands” suggests that Chinese 
SOEs are imposed on policy burdens, such as hiring redundant workers. Such burdens 
may hamper corporate development, resulting in poor corporate performance (Lin, Cai, 
& Li, 1998). Moreover, the actual controllers of SOEs, who are central or local 
government officials, are also agents in charge of state-owned assets. Hopkin and 
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Rodríguez-Pose (2007) argue that government agents may abuse their power to 
expropriate corporate resources and seek rents, leading to more severe moral hazard 
and adverse selection in SOEs. For example, Feng et al. (2019) find that government 
intervention promotes firms’ financial access to capital by making informal payments. 
Nevertheless, the above analysis suggests that the relationship between managerial 
ability and goodwill impairment may differ in SOEs and non-SOEs due to potential 
government intervention in SOEs. To examine whether state ownership does affect the 
relationship between managerial ability and goodwill impairment, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: State ownership significantly moderates the relationship between managerial 
ability and goodwill impairment. 
 
3. Methodology and sample 
This section introduces our methodology to explore how managerial ability matter for 
goodwill impairment. As managerial ability is our key explanatory variable which is 
not directly observable, we first illustrate how to measure managerial ability in Section 
3.1. We then present our mediation model in Section 3.2 and the moderated mediation 
model in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we describe our sample and data. 
 
3.1 Measuring managerial ability 
Properly quantifying managerial ability is challenging but central to many research 
questions. Recently, Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) develop a novel measure of 
managerial ability based on managers’ relative efficiency in generating revenues. 
Demerjian et al. (2012) show that their measure is strongly associated with manager 
fixed effects and with some indicators of corporate performance, and demonstrate that 
their measure outperforms the existing measures. Therefore, we apply their measure to 
capture managerial ability for Chinese firms. Following Demerjian et al. (2012), we 
first employ the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to generate a measure of 
total firm efficiency (Ɵ) from Eq. (1): 




COGS SG A R D PPE GW Intan
      + + + + +          (1) 
where COGS (cost of goods sold), SG&A (selling, general and administrative expenses), 
R&D (research and development cost), PPE (property, plant and equipment), GW 
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(goodwill), and Intan (other intangibles) are input variables of total firm efficiency 
while Sales is the corresponding output variable. Besides, the flow variables Sales, 
COGS, SG&A and R&D are measured over year t, while the stock variables PPE, GW, 
and Intan are measured at the beginning of year t. Demerjian et al. (2012) also take the 
net operating leases as an input to increase the input comparability among firms that 
either lease or buy their revenue-generating equipment. Notice that Chinese listed 
companies usually buy rather than lease fixed assets, we do not include the operating 
leases in our model. As DEA evaluates all points with respect to their deviation from 
the frontier, the values of Ɵ are between 0 and 1.  
We solve Eq. (1) to obtain Ɵ and then regress Ɵ on six firm characteristics that 
affect firm efficiency: firm size (Size), market share (Mshare), cash availability 
(CashFlow), life cycle (AGE), operational complexity (Concentration), and foreign 
operations (Foreign): 
  0 1 2 3 4 5
6
Size Mshare CashFlow Age Concentration
Foreign Year
      
 
= + + + + +
+ + +      (2) 
where the residual ɛ is used as a proxy for managerial ability, as suggested by Demerjian 
et al. (2012). In Eq. (2), Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s assets at the end of year 
t. Mshare is the share of firm sales to industry total sales. CashFlow is an indicator 
variable for available cash, which equals one when a firm has nonnegative free cash 
flow and otherwise zero. Age is the number of years for which the firm has been listed. 
Concentration indicates the diversification of a firm’s operations, measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of business segment sales within the firm. Foreign is an 
indicator variable which equals one if the firm reports nonzero value of foreign currency 
adjustment and otherwise zero. 
  
3.2 The mediation model 
Based on the framework of testing mediation effect suggested by Baron and Kenny 
(1986), we construct the following model (Eqs. (3) to (5)) to examine whether financial 
performance is the mediator between managerial ability and the likelihood of goodwill 
impairment:  
0 1 'it it it itIMP c c MA c CONTROLS YearFE IndustryFE = + + + + +          (3) 
0 1_ 'it it it itAB ROA a a MA a CONTROLS YearFE IndustryFE = + + + + +          (4) 
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0 1 1' ' _ 'it it it it itIMP c c MA b AB ROA b CONTROLS YearFE IndustryFE = + + + + + +  (5) 
where IMP is an indicator which equals 1 if the firm records a goodwill impairment in 
year t and 0 otherwise. MA indicates managerial ability scores obtained from Eq. (2). 
AB_ROA is the proxy for financial performance, calculated as the difference between 
firm i’s ROA and the industry average ROA over year t. We calculate ROA as the EBIT 
before goodwill impairment divided by annual average total assets to avoid potential 
simultaneity bias.  
CONTROLS refers to firm-level control variables that are likely to affect goodwill 
impairment incidence (see Beatty & Weber, 2006; Glaum et al., 2018; Ramanna & 
Watts, 2012): RETURN is a firm’s annual stock return; BIG4 is an indicator that equals 
1 for firms that are audited by a Big 4 auditing firm; INSTI_OWN is the percentage of 
equity shares held by institutional investors; SEGMENT is the number of operating 
segments; SIZE is the log of annual average assets; GW/TA is the ratio of goodwill 
before impairment to annual average assets; and MBV is a firm’s market-to-book ratio 




Note: This figure summarizes our mediation model. The solid line (𝑐1) indicates the direct effect of MA 
on IMP in Eq. (3), while the dotted lines (𝑎1, 𝑏1 and 𝑐1′) illustrate the mediation paths from MA to IMP 
that is driven by AB_ROA. 
Fig. 1: The conceptual mediation model 
 
We estimate Eq. (3) and Eq. (5) by Logistic regression to examine the effect of 
managerial ability on the likelihood of goodwill impairment while Eq. (4) is estimated 
by OLS regression to examine the effect of managerial ability on financial performance. 
Fig. 1 summarizes the conceptual mediation model (Eqs. (3)-(5)). The steps to evaluate 
the mediation model are described as follows: First, managerial ability has a significant 
direct impact on the likelihood of goodwill impairment if MA coefficient c1 in Eq. (3) 
is significant. Second, financial performance mediates the relationship between 
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managerial ability and goodwill impairment if MA coefficient 𝑎1 in Eq. (4) and 
AB_ROA coefficient b1 in Eq. (5) are statistically significant. Third, there is a partial 
mediation effect if MA coefficient c1' in Eq. (5) becomes smaller and less significant 




3.3 The moderated mediation model 
To examine whether and how earnings smoothing and state ownership moderate the 
mediation effect of financial performance, below we construct the moderated mediation 
model following Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt (2005): 
0 1 2 3 'it it it it it it
it
IMP c c MA c SMOOTH c MA SMOOTH c CONTROLS YearFE
IndustryFE 
= + + +  + +
+ +  (6) 
0 1 2 3_ + 'it it it it it it
it
AB ROA a a MA a SMOOTH a MA SMOOTH a CONTROLS
YearFE IndustryFE 
= + +  +
+ + +      (7) 
0 1 2 1 2' ' ' _ _
'
it it it it it it
it it
IMP c c MA c SMOOTH b AB ROA b AB ROA SMOOTH
b CONTROLS YearFE IndustryFE 
= + + + + 
+ + + +     (8) 
0 1 2 3 1
2
' ' ' + ' _
_ '
it it it it it it
it it it it
IMP c c MA c SMOOTH c MA SMOOTH b AB ROA
b AB ROA SMOOTH b CONTROLS YearFE IndustryFE 
= + +  +
+  + + + +    (9) 
where SMOOTH is an indicator for earnings smoothing motivation, taking 1 if the firm 
i’s income is positive in year t and its yearly change is above the median of firms with 
positive changes in income in the same year, and 0 otherwise (c.f., AbuGhazaleh et al., 
2011; Glaum et al., 2018). We replace SMOOTH in the Eqs (6) to (9) by SOE to examine 
the moderation effect of state ownership with the same procedure, where SOE is an 
indicator which equals 1 if a firm is a SOE and 0 otherwise. 
In the above moderated mediation model, Eq. (6) aims to examine whether 
earnings smoothing motivation (or state ownership) moderates the direct effect of 
managerial ability on the likelihood of goodwill impairment; Eq. (7) examines whether 
earnings smoothing motivation (or state ownership) moderates managerial ability’s 
effect on financial performance; Eqs. (8) and (9) intend to examine whether earnings 
smoothing motivation (or state ownership) moderates the effect of financial 
performance on goodwill impairment. The conceptual moderated mediation model is 





Note: This figure depicts the possible moderating paths of earnings smoothing motivation or state 
ownership on the direct (solid lines) or indirect (dotted lines) effect of managerial ability on goodwill 
impairment. 
Fig. 2: The conceptual moderated mediation model 
 
Take the earnings smoothing motivation as an example, the steps to investigate its 
moderation effect are as follows: First, a significant coefficient c3 of the interaction 
MA×SMOOTH in Eq. (6) indicates that the earnings smoothing motivation moderates 
the direct effect of managerial ability on goodwill impairment. Second, if the direct 
effect is moderated, we then estimate Eq. (7) and Eq. (9), and otherwise Eq. (7) and Eq. 
(8). Third, if the coefficient 𝑎3 of the interaction MA×SMOOTH in Eq. (7) and the 
coefficient b1 of AB_ROA in Eq. (8) or Eq. (9) are significant, we argue that earnings 
smoothing motivation moderates the mediation path from managerial ability to 
financial performance. Likewise, if MA coefficient 𝑎1 in Eq. (7) and the coefficient b2 
of the interaction AB_ROA×SMOOTH in Eq. (8) or Eq. (9) are significant, we argue 
that earnings smoothing motivation moderates the mediation path from financial 
performance to goodwill impairment. 
 
3.4 Sample, data and descriptive statistics 
To examine the effect of managerial ability on goodwill impairment, we consider the 
977 firms included in the Shanghai 50 Index and the Shenzhen Component Index over 
the period 2007-2017. These firms account for more than 70% of the Chinese stock 
market in terms of market value and therefore are a good representation of the whole 
stock market. Our sample starts from 2007 because the new Chinese Accounting 
Standards (CAS) were implemented since 2007. We exclude 55 financial firms because 
their operation patterns and financial structures are quite different from non-financial 
firms. We also require that firms should have positive goodwill balances and ever 
recognize goodwill impairment. As a result, our sample comprises 389 firms with 2689 
firm-year observations. We obtain all data on these firms from the Wind database. 
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To investigate whether firm-level characteristics when firm-year observations with 
goodwill impairment are significantly different from that when firm-year observations 
without goodwill impairment, we divide our firm-year observations into two groups: 
one with (IMP=1) and one without (IMP=0) goodwill impairment records. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics of these two groups, as well as the results of t test (two-
tailed) for differences in means. We find that the mean of managerial ability (MA) for 
the group without an observation of goodwill impairment is -0.02, being significantly 
higher than that of the group with goodwill impairment observations. This implies that 
managerial ability probably has a significant impact on the possibility of goodwill 
impairment. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Note: This table presents mean, median, and standard deviation of each variable for the group that 
recognize goodwill impairment (IMP=0) and the group without an observation of goodwill impairment 
(IMP=1). MA is the managerial ability score obtained from Eq. (2). AB_ROA is the difference between 
firm specific ROA and industry average ROA. RETURN is the firm’s annual stock return, BIG 4 is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 for firms that are audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms; INSTI_OWN 
is the percentage of equity shares held by institutional investors; SEGMENT is the number of operating 
segments; SIZE is the log of annual average assets; GW/TA is the ratio of goodwill before impairment to 
average assets; MBV is the firm’s market-to-book ratio of annual average assets. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate the effects of outliers.  
Group IMP=0 (Obs.=2030) IMP=1 (Obs.=668) Difference in 
Mean Variables Mean Median Std.Dev Mean Median Std.Dev 
MA -0.02 -0.02 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.02*** 
AB_ROA 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02*** 
SMOOTH 0.38 0 0.48 0.34 0 0.48 0.03 
SOE 0.35 0 0.48 0.31 0 0.46 0.04** 
RETURN 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01*** 
INSTI_OWN 0.42 0.41 0.24 0.36 0.33 0.22 0.06*** 
BIG4 0.09 0 0.29 0.06 0 0.23 0.04*** 
SEGMENT 3.35 3 1.80 3.27 3 1.84 0.08 
SIZE 22.49 22.23 1.50 22.65 22.44 1.31 -0.16** 
MBV 2.43 1.95 1.51 2.32 1.91 1.40 0.11* 
GW/TA 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.12 -0.03*** 
 
In addition, the group without an observation of goodwill impairment has higher 
abnormal ROA (AB_ROA) and stock return (RETURN) than the other group. These 
results suggest that, on average, the Chinese companies have better accounting and 
13 
 
market performance when they do not need to write off goodwill impairment, which is 
in line with our expectation. For other control variables, the tests of difference in means 
seem to suggest that Chinese companies tend to have higher institutional shares and 
market-to-book ratios, lower ratios of goodwill to assets, and to choose the Big 4 
auditing firms when they do not have to recognize goodwill impairment (see Table 1). 
 
4. Results 
This section presents our results and analyses for the hypotheses developed in Section 
2. First, we analyze the mediation effect of financial performance in the relationship 
between managerial ability and goodwill impairment in Section 4.1. Sections 4.2 and 
4.3 examine whether the mediation effect of financial performance depends on earnings 
smoothing motivation and state ownership, respectively. In Section 4.4, we perform 
additional tests to assess the robustness of our findings. 
 
4.1 Analysis of the mediation effect of financial performance 
This subsection examines whether the effect of managerial ability on the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment is mediated by financial performance using the mediation model 
illustrated in Section 3.2. First, we perform Hausman tests for Eqs. (3) to (5) where the 
results appear to support the use of random effects models4. Second, we calculate the 
variance inflation factors of our independent variables where the values range from 1.08 
to 2.00, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in our regressions. Table 2 
presents the estimation results of Eqs. (3) to (5).  
In Eq. (3), MA’s coefficient is -0.143 with p-value smaller than 0.01, suggesting 
that managerial ability has a negative direct impact on the likelihood of goodwill 
impairment. Moreover, the marginal effect suggests that the likelihood of writing off 
goodwill decreases by 2.16% when managerial ability increases by one standard 
deviation (see Table 2). These results support our first hypothesis developed in Section 
2.1 and are in line with the finding of Sun (2016). 
In Eq. (4), the coefficient of MA is 0.281 with p-value smaller than 0.01, 
suggesting that higher managerial ability significantly results in higher corporate 
returns. This finding is consistent with the intuition that superior managers are more 
 
4
 To be careful, we also present the results of two-way fixed-effects models in Appendix B, which 
delivers the same conclusion as that presented in this section. 
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likely to earn higher returns for their companies. In Eq. (5), the coefficient of MA is 
smaller and less significant compared with that in Eq. (3), and the absolute value of the 
marginal effect of MA decreases from 2.16% in Eq. (3) to 1.46% in Eq. (5). Moreover, 
the coefficient of AB_ROA is -0.173, being significant at the 1% level (see Table 2). 
These results suggest that the reduction in the marginal effect of MA is due to the 
inclusion of the mediator AB_ROA to the model.  
Table 2. The mediation effect of financial performance 
Note: Estimation results of Eqs. (3)-(5). We illustrate the economic significance by marginal effects of 
independent variables in logistic regression of Eq. (3) and Eq. (5), which mean how the probability of 
impairing goodwill changes with one standard deviation increase in corresponding variable. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate the effects of outliers and normalized 
to eliminate the effect of different dimension. Variables definitions please see the note of Table 1. 
Standard errors of estimate are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Model Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) 
Dependent Variable IMP AB_ROA IMP Coef Margins Coef Coef Margins 
MA -0.143*** -2.16% 0.281*** -0.095* -1.46% 
 (0.052)  (0.017) (0.054)  
AB_ROA    -0.173*** -2.83% 
    (0.060)  
RETURN -0.022 -0.35% 0.035 -0.010 -0.16% 
 (0.081)  (0.024) (0.081)  
INSTI_OWN -0.221*** -3.42% 0.100*** -0.203*** -3.15% 
 (0.062)  (0.023) (0.062)  
BIG4 -0.510** -2.24% -0.272** -0.545** -2.39% 
 (0.246)  (0.116) (0.247)  
SEGMENTS 0.092* 1.52% -0.050** 0.086 1.42% 
 (0.056)  (0.024) (0.056)  
SIZE 0.099 1.63% 0.046 0.107 1.76% 
 (0.088)  (0.039) (0.088)  
MBV -0.032 -0.51% 0.259*** 0.012 0.20% 
 (0.073)  (0.025) (0.074)  
GW_TA 0.106* 1.76% -0.027 0.110** 1.83% 
 (0.054)  (0.021) (0.054)  
Year fixed effect Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included 





The mediating process of financial performance is displayed in Fig. 3 in an 
intuitive way. To formally determine the statistical significance of the mediation effect, 
we calculate the Sobel (1982) test and find that the z-statistic is -3.37, which is 
significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that corporate financial performance 
partially mediates the impact of managerial ability on the likelihood of goodwill 
impairment. The finding supports our second hypothesis developed in Section 2.1.  
 
Note: This figure depicts how financial performance partially mediates in the relationship between 
managerial ability (MA) and goodwill impairment incidence (IMP). The solid line and dotted lines 
indicate the direct effect and indirect effect of MA on IMP, respectively. 
Fig. 3. The mediation path of financial performance 
 
At last, similar to the finding of Glaum et al. (2018), we find that the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment is negatively and significantly associated with INSTI_OWN and 
BIG4, and positively and significantly associated with GW_TA. These results suggest 
that the companies with higher percentage of equity shares held by institutional 
investors and audited by Big 4 auditing firms are less likely to recognize goodwill 
impairment, while the companies with higher ratios of goodwill before impairment 
relative to assets are more likely to write off goodwill.  
 
4.2 Analysis of the moderation effect of earnings smoothing motivation 
To examine whether earnings smoothing motivation affects the indirect effect of 
managerial ability on goodwill impairment, we estimate Eqs. (6) to (9) presented in 
Section 3.3. The results are summarized in Table 3. 
We find that the coefficient of the interaction MA×SMOOTH is insignificant in 
both Eqs. (6) and (7). This suggests that earnings smoothing motivation does not affect 
the direct effect of managerial ability on goodwill impairment incidence and the impact 
of managerial ability on financial performance. However, the coefficients of AB_ROA 
and the interaction AB_ROA×SMOOTH in Eq. (8) are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. These results support our third hypothesis that earnings smoothing motivation 
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significantly moderates the mediation effect of financial performance, where the 
moderation takes effect in the relationship between financial performance and goodwill 
impairment. Fig. 4 displays the moderation effect of earnings smoothing motivation on 
the mediation paths in an intuitive way. 
Table 3. The moderation effect of earnings smoothing motivation 
Note: Estimation results of Eqs. (6)-(8). As the direct effect is not moderated by earnings smoothing 
motivation, we regress Eq (8) after regressing (6) and (7). Continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 
99th percentiles to eliminate the effects of outliers and normalized to eliminate the effect of different 
dimension. Variables definitions refer to the note of Table 1. Standard errors of estimate are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Model Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (8) 
Dependent Variable IMP AB_ROA IMP 
MA -0.193*** 0.235*** -0.098* 
 (0.066) (0.020) (0.054) 
SMOOTH 0.028 0.627*** 0.141 
 (0.112) (0.032) (0.124) 
MA×SMOOTH 0.127 0.001  
 (0.105) (0.029)  
AB_ROA   -0.374*** 
   (0.082) 
AB_ROA×SMOOTH   0.419*** 
   (0.123) 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included 
N 2698 2698 2698 
 
 
Note: This figure depicts how earnings smoothing moderates the mechanism between managerial 
ability (MA) and goodwill impairment incidence (IMP). The solid line and dotted lines indicate the 
direct effect and indirect effect of MA on IMP, respectively. 




Specifically, the average effect of financial performance (AB_ROA) on goodwill 
impairment incidence (IMP) is -0.374 for companies without earnings smoothing 
motivation (SMOOTH =0), while 0.045 (i.e., 0.419 - 0.374) for companies with 
earnings smoothing motivation (SMOOTH =1) (see Table 3). These results suggest that 
a company is more likely to write off goodwill for the sake of smoothing earnings when 
the company achieves higher returns. Therefore, the presence of earnings smoothing 
motivation weakens the indirect effect of managerial ability on goodwill impairment. 
Our findings are supported by Glaum et al. (2018) who find that firms with unusually 
high income tend to utilize goodwill impairment as a way to smooth earnings. 
 
4.3 Analysis of the moderation effect of state ownership  
To examine whether state ownership affects the indirect effect of managerial ability on 
goodwill impairment, we replace SMOOTH in Eqs. (6) to (9) by SOE and re-estimate 
the equations as done in Section 4.2. We present the results in Table 4. 
Table 4. The moderation effect of state ownership 
Note: Estimation results of Eq (6), (7) and (9) after replacing SMOOTH by SOE. As the direct link 
between managerial ability and goodwill impairment is moderated by property rights, we regress Eq (9) 
after regressing (6) and (7). Continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate 
the effects of outliers and normalized to eliminate the effect of different dimension. Variables definitions 
refer to the note of Table 1. Standard errors of estimate are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Model Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (9)  
Dependent Variable IMP AB_ROA IMP 
MA -0.205*** 0.307*** -0.159** 
 (0.063) (0.021) (0.067) 
SOE 0.163 -0.111 0.137 
 (0.139) (0.070) (0.140) 
MA×SOE 0.202* -0.077** 0.192* 




   (0.073) 
AB_ROA×SOE   -0.042 
   (0.124) 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included 




We find that the coefficient of SOE is insignificant in all equations, but the 
coefficient of the interaction MA×SOE is statistically significant in Eqs. (6) and (7). 
The results suggest that state ownership has a significant impact on the direct effect of 
managerial ability on goodwill impairment incidence and on the relationship between 
managerial ability and financial performance. Therefore, we estimate Eq. (9) instead of 
Eq. (8) to evaluate whether state ownership moderates the mediation effect of financial 
performance. We find that the coefficient of MA becomes less significant in Eq. (9) 
while the coefficient of the interaction MA×SOE remains significant at the 10% level. 
Besides, the coefficient of the interaction AB_ROA×SOE in Eq. (9) is insignificant (see 
Table 4). Though the moderation effect of state ownership is relatively modest, our 
results suggest that state ownership mainly affects the relationship between managerial 
ability and financial performance, thereby moderating the impact of managerial ability 
on goodwill impairment. Fig. 5 displays the moderation effect of state ownership on the 
direct and mediation paths in an intuitive way. 
 
Note: It shows how state ownership moderates the link between managerial ability (MA) and goodwill 
impairment incidence (IMP). The solid lines and dotted lines indicate the direct effect and indirect effect 
of MA on IMP, respectively. 
Fig. 5. The direct and mediation effects moderated by state ownership 
 
Specifically, the average direct effect of managerial ability on the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment is -0.205 for non-SOEs, while the effect basically vanishes (-
0.003=-0.205+0.202) for SOEs (see the Eq. (6) column of Table 4). Similarly, the 
average effect of managerial ability on financial performance is 0.307 for non-SOEs 
while 0.23 for SOEs, which suggests that the positive relationship between managerial 
ability and financial performance is impaired by companies’ state ownership, as 
discussed in Section 2.3. Due to the impact of state ownership, the estimate results of 
Eq. (9) show that the effect of managerial ability on the likelihood of goodwill 
impairment becomes positive (0.033=-0.159+0.192) (see Table 4). Overall, the results 
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support our fourth hypothesis that state ownership significantly moderates the 
relationship between managerial ability and goodwill impairment. 
 
4.4 Robustness checks 
To examine the robustness of our findings, we perform three tests as described below. 
First, our sample period contains the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, which caused 
profound impact on both the economy and the companies. To examine whether the 
moderated mediation effects in the relationship between managerial ability and 
goodwill impairment is driven by the crisis, we re-estimate our models for the period 
of 2010-2017. Table 5 presents the results for the mediation effect of financial 
performance (see Panel A), the moderation effect of earnings smoothing motivation 
(see Panel B), and the moderation effect of state ownership (see Panel C). The results 
show that our findings remain the same. 
Second, we examine whether our findings are sensitive to the proxies for 
managerial ability and financial performance. To this end, we apply the decile rankings 
of companies’ managerial ability (MARANK) proposed by Demerjian et al. (2012) as 
another proxy for managerial ability. This approach can, to some extent, alleviate 
possible measurement errors in managerial ability scores (Lee et al., 2018). In addition, 
we use the growth of ROA (∆ROA) instead of the abnormal ROA relative to the industry 
average ROA to capture corporate performance. Table 6 and Table 7 present the results 
of our (moderated) mediation models when we use MARANK as the explanatory 
variable and ∆ROA as the mediator, respectively. We find that the results are comparable 
the same as those presented in the previous subsections, which suggests that our 
findings are not driven by the way to capture managerial ability and financial 
performance. 
Third, we examine whether our findings are sensitive to the way to define the 
dependent variable. We calculate the ratio of goodwill impairment to total goodwill 
before impairment (IMP_GW) for each company and take it as an alternative dependent 
variable. In this way, we are able to assess the impact of managerial ability on the 
magnitude of goodwill impairment with Tobit regressions. We present the results in 
Table 8 for the mediation effect of financial performance (see Panel A), the moderation 
effect of earnings smoothing motivation (see Panel B), and the moderation effect of 
state ownership (see Panel C). Overall, the results appear to support our hypotheses 




Table 5. Regression results based on the 2010-2017 period 
Note: This table presents the regression results for the period excluding the crisis (i.e., 2010-2017). Panel A, B and C report the test results 
of the mediating effect of financial performance, the moderating effect of earnings smoothing motivation and property rights, respectively. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate the effects of outliers and normalized to eliminate the effect of 
different dimension. Variables definitions refer to the note of Table 1. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
  Panel A   Panel B   Panel C  
Model Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (8) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (9) 
Dependent Variable IMP AB_ROA IMP IMP AB_ROA IMP IMP AB_ROA IMP 
MA -0.147*** 0.254*** -0.114* -0.198*** 0.211*** -0.118** -0.212*** 0.289*** -0.187** 
SMOOTH    0.039 0.609*** 0.105    
SOE       0.166 -0.047 0.148 
MA×SMOOTH    0.127 -0.000     
MA×SOE       0.235* -0.115*** 0.237* 
AB_ROA   -0.123*   -0.344***   -0.086 
AB_ROA×SMOOTH      0.476***    
AB_ROA×SOE         -0.086 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 





Table 6. Alternative measure of managerial ability 
Note: We change the proxy for managerial ability from MA to MARANK. Panel A, B and C report the test results of the mediating effect of 
financial performance, the moderating effect of earnings smoothing motivation and property rights, respectively. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and normalized. Variables definitions refer to the note of Table 1. ***, ** and * mean statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Panel A   Panel B  Panel C   
Model Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (8) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (9) 
Dependent Variable IMP AB_ROA IMP IMP AB_ROA IMP IMP AB_ROA IMP 
MARANK -0.036* 0.093*** -0.015 -0.047* 0.073*** -0.014 -0.062*** 0.100*** -0.042 
SMOOTH    -0.272 0.557*** 0.033    
SOE       -0.24 -0.075 -0.263 
MARANK×SMOOTH    0.036 0.012     
MARANK×SOE       0.085** -0.022 0.082* 
AB_ROA   -0.205***   -0.429***   -0.171** 
AB_ROA×SMOOTH      0.504***    
AB_ROA×SOE         -0.056 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 





Table 7. Alternative measure of financial performance 
Note: We change the proxy for financial performance from AB_ROA to △ROA. Panel A, B and C report the test results of the mediating 
effect of financial performance, the moderating effect of earnings smoothing motivation and state ownership, respectively. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and normalized. Variables definitions refer to the note of Table 1. ***, ** and * mean 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Panel A   Panel B  Panel C   
Model Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (8) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (9) 
Dependent Variable IMP AB_ROA IMP IMP AB_ROA IMP IMP AB_ROA IMP 
MARANK -0.143*** 0.196*** -0.103* -0.193*** 0.225*** -0.090* -0.205*** 0.254*** -0.159** 
SMOOTH    0.028 0.686*** 0.290*    
SOE       0.163 -0.094 0.174 
MARANK×SMOOTH    0.127 0.101*** 0.162    
MARANK×SOE       0.202* -0.180*** 0.167 
AB_ROA   -0.125**   -0.414***   -0.081 
AB_ROA×SMOOTH      0.440***    
AB_ROA×SOE         -0.137 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 






Table 8. Tobit regression results 
Note: The dependent variable is replaced by the ratio of goodwill impairment to total goodwill before impairment (IMP_MP) thus we 
estimate Tobit regressions. Panel A, B and C report the test results of the mediating effect of financial performance, the moderating effect 
of earnings smoothing motivation and state ownership, respectively. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and 
normalized. Variables definitions refer to the note of Table 1. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Panel A   Panel B  Panel C   
Model Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (8) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (9) 
Dependent Variable IMP_GW AB_ROA IMP_GW IMP_GW AB_ROA IMP_GW IMP_GW AB_ROA IMP_GW 
MA 0.049*** 0.279*** -0.040 -0.060*** 0.230*** -0.016 -0.068*** 0.307*** -0.044** 
SMOOTH    0.008 0.781*** 0.073*    
SOE       0.090** -0.111 0.071* 
MA×SMOOTH    0.029 -0.027 -0.158    
MA×SOE       0.065* -0.077** 0.065* 
AB_ROA   -0.354***   -0.179***   -0.076*** 
AB_ROA×SMOOTH      0.175***    
AB_ROA×SOE         0.049 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 





Our paper is the first to explore the moderated mediation effects in the relationship 
between managerial ability and goodwill impairment of Chinese companies. We find 
robust evidence that corporate financial performance partially mediates the negative 
effect of managerial ability on the likelihood of goodwill impairment. Moreover, the 
mediation effect is weakened by companies’ earnings smoothing motivation and state 
ownership. Our results suggest that when a company has the motivation to smooth 
earnings or is owned by the government, higher managerial ability of the company does 
not necessarily reduce the likelihood of goodwill impairment. In contrast, the negative 
effect of managerial ability on the likelihood of goodwill impairment is evident for non-
SOEs without earnings smoothing motivation. Overall, our findings are supported by 
related literature (see AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; Demerjian et al., 2020; Feng et al., 
2019; Glaum et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018). 
Our findings deliver important implications for corporate governance and 
regulation on goodwill impairment. First, it is worth for firms to enhance the managerial 
ability in order to avoid goodwill impairment losses. Second, the regulators and 
investors should also pay attention to other factors such as earnings smoothing 
motivation and state ownership when analyzing a company’s goodwill impairment 
decision. As our investigation in this paper focuses on Chinese companies, other 
researchers may follow our methodology to explore the moderated mediation effects in 
the relationships between goodwill impairment and variables of interest. Doing so will 
largely enrich the knowledge on companies’ goodwill impairment decisions and 






Appendix A. The development of goodwill of Chinese companies 
 
 
Note: Total goodwill (billion yuan) is calculated as total book value of the goodwill of Chinese publicly 
listed companies in a given year. Goodwill/Assets indicates the equal-weighted average ratio of goodwill-
to-assets of all companies in a given year. Data source: RESSET database and authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix B. Results of two-way fixed-effects models 
In Section 4, we use random effects estimation technique to perform our analysis. Here 
we present the results of year-firm two-way fixed effects models, which delivers the 
same conclusion as reported in Section 4. 
 
  
Table B1. Fixed effects model 
Note: This table reports fixed-effects regression results. Because industry dummies are time-invariant, we exclude them in the fixed-effects 
regression. Panel A, B and C report the test results of the mediating effect of financial performance, the moderating effect of earnings 
smoothing motivation and state ownership, respectively. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and normalized. 
Variables definitions refer to the note of Table 1. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Panel A   Panel B  Panel C   
Model Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (8) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (9) 
Dependent Variable IMP_GW AB_ROA IMP_GW IMP_GW AB_ROA IMP_GW IMP_GW AB_ROA IMP_GW 
MA -0.243*** 0.281*** -0.192*** -0.297*** 0.242*** -0.189*** -0.306*** 0.300*** -0.192*** 
AB_ROA   -0.186**   -0.398***   -0.140 
SMOOTH    0.093 0.576*** 0.199    
MA×SMOOTH    0.133 -0.007     
AB_ROA×SMOOTH      0.410***    
SOE       0.131 0.088 0.136 
MA×SOE       0.203* -0.053 0.275* 
AB_ROA×SOE         -0.263 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 2587 2698 2587 2587 2698 2587 2587 2698 2587 
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